WARNING! ANYWHERE YOU LOOK ON THIS PAGE, YOU WILL FIND SOME ENLIGHTENING BUT POTENT WORDS. IF IN A HURRY (and you shouldn't be), NO NEED FOR CONTINUATIVE READING. JUST SCROLL AT RANDOM AND POINT THE CURSOR: GOD WILL SPEAK TO YOU RIGHT THERE!

THIS PAGE FLOWS FROM THE RIVER OF WISDOM MY ORIGINAL SOURCE CANNOT CONTAIN

אמן ----- I AM YOUR GOD ----- آمين


...But many who are first will be last, and many who are last will be first.
God's latest entry is last: so scroll down to bottom of page to read latest wisdom.

יום ראשון

 

~ I AM THAT I AM ~ IO SONO COLUI CHE È


I
Am
God Your God
God I Am God Your God
God I Am God Your God I Am God
God Your God I Am God Your God I Am
God Your God I Am God God Your God I Am God
I Your God I Am God Your God I Am God God Your God
I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God God Your
God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God God Your
God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God God Your God
I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God God Your God I Am God
Your God I Am God Your God I Am God God Your God I Am God Your God I
I Am God Your God I Am God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am I
God Your God I Am God God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God
I Am God I God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God I
I God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God I God Your
God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God God Your God I Am I
I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God God Your God I Am God
Your God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God Am
I Am God Your God I Am God God Your God I Am God Your God I Am
I God Your God I Am God God Your God I Am God Your God I Am I
Am God Your God I Am God Your God Your God I Am God Your
God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God Your
God I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am God I
Am God Your God I Am God Your God Am God Your
God I Am God God Your God I Am God Your God
I Am God Your God I Am God Your God I Am
God Your God I Am God Your God I Am
God Your God I Am God I Am God
I God Your God I Am Your God
God Your God I Am God
I Am God Your God
I Am God Your
God I Am
I Am
I
I Am
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods before me. Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. Love
your neighbor as yourself. I am the Lord your God. You shall have no other gods
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Dio Il Signore
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore
Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore
Dio Tuo Io Sono Io Sono Il Signore Dio
Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io
Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo
Io Sono Io Sono Dio
Signore Dio Tuo
Io Sono Dio
Io Dio
Dio
Io
Dio
Io Dio
Io Sono Dio
Signore Dio Tuo
Io Sono Io Sono Dio
Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io
Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io
Dio Tuo Io Sono Io Sono Il Signore Dio
Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Dio Io
Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Il Signore Dio Tuo Io Sono Dio Il Signore
Io sono il Signore Dio Tuo. Non avrai altro dio all’infuori di Me. Amerai Dio
Amerai il Signore Dio tuo con tutto il tuo cuore, con tutta la tua anima e con
tutta la tua mente. Amerai il prossimo tuo come te stesso. Amerai Dio
Io sono Io il Signore Dio Tuo. Non avrai altro dio all’infuori di Me.
Amerai il Signore Dio tuo con tutto il tuo cuore, con tutta la tua
mente. Amerai il prossimo tuo come te stesso. Amerai Dio
Sono. Non avrai altro dio all’infuori di Me. Amerai Dio
Signore Dio tuo con tutto il tuo cuore, con tutta la
tua anima e con tutta la tua mente. Amerai il
prossimo tuo come te stesso. Amerai Dio
Io sono il Signore Dio Tuo. Non avrai
altro dio all’infuori di Me. Amerai
Dio. Amerai il Signore Dio tuo
con tutto il cuore, con tutta
la tua anima e con tutta
la tua mente. Dio
Amerai Tuo Dio
come te stesso
Amerai Dio
Signore
Dio
Io
Io sono il Signore Dio Tuo. Non avrai altro dio all’infuori di Me. Amerai Dio
Amerai il Signore Dio tuo con tutto il tuo cuore, con tutta la tua anima e con
tutta la tua mente. Amerai il prossimo tuo come te stesso. Amerai Dio
Io sono Io il Signore Dio Tuo. Non avrai altro dio all’infuori di Me.
Amerai il Signore Dio tuo con tutto il tuo cuore, con tutta la tua
mente. Amerai il prossimo tuo come te stesso. Amerai Dio
Sono. Non avrai altro dio all’infuori di Me. Amerai Dio
Signore Dio tuo con tutto il tuo cuore, con tutta la
tua anima e con tutta la tua mente. Amerai il
prossimo tuo come te stesso. Amerai Dio
Io sono il Signore Dio Tuo. Non avrai
altro dio all’infuori di Me. Amerai
Dio. Amerai il Signore Dio tuo
con tutto il cuore, con tutta
la tua anima e con tutta
la tua mente. Dio
Amerai Tuo Dio
come te stesso
Amerai Dio
Signore
Dio
Io

I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. You shall have no other gods before me. You shall not make for yourself a graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is on the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; you shall not bow down to them or serve them; for I the LORD your God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation of those who hate me, but showing steadfast love to thousands of those who love me and keep my commandments

Io sono il Signore, tuo Dio, che ti ho fatto uscire dal paese d'Egitto, dalla condizione di schiavitù; non avrai altri dei di fronte a me. Non ti farai idolo né immagine alcuna di ciò che è lassù nel cielo, né di ciò che è quaggiù sulla terra, né di ciò che è nelle acque sotto terra. Non ti prostrerai davanti a loro e non li servirai perché io, il Signore, sono il tuo Dio, un Dio geloso, che punisce la colpa dei padri nei figli fino alla terza e alla quarta generazione, per coloro che mi odiano, ma che dimostra il suo favore fino a mille generazioni, per quelli che mi amano e osservano i miei comandi

You shall not take the name of the LORD your God in vain: for the LORD will not hold him guiltless who takes his name in vain

Non pronuncerai invano il nome del Signore, tuo Dio, perché il Signore non lascerà impunito chi pronuncia il suo nome invano.

Observe the sabbath day, to keep it holy, as the LORD your God commanded you. Six days you shall labor, and do all your work; but the seventh day is a sabbath to the LORD your God; in it you shall not do any work, you, or your son, or your daughter, or your manservant, or your maidservant, or your ox, or your ass, or any of your cattle, or the sojourner who is within your gates, that your manservant and your maidservant may rest as well as you. You shall remember that you were a servant in the land of Egypt, and the LORD your God brought you out thence with a mighty hand and an outstretched arm; therefore the LORD your God commanded you to keep the sabbath day

Ricordati del giorno di sabato per santificarlo: sei giorni faticherai e farai ogni tuo lavoro; ma il settimo giorno è il sabato in onore del Signore, tuo Dio: tu non farai alcun lavoro, né tu, né tuo figlio, né tua figlia, né il tuo schiavo, né la tua schiava, né il tuo bestiame, né il forestiero che dimora presso di te. Ricordati che sei stato schiavo nel paese d'Egitto e che il Signore tuo Dio ti ha fatto uscire di là con mano potente e braccio teso; perciò il Signore tuo Dio ti ordina di osservare il giorno di sabato

Honour your father and your mother, as the LORD your God commanded you; that your days may be prolonged, and that it may go well with you, in the land which the LORD your God gives you

Onora tuo padre e tua madre, come il Signore Dio tuo ti ha comandato, perché la tua vita sia lunga e tu sii felice nel paese che il Signore tuo Dio ti dà

You shall not kill

Non uccidere

Neither shall you commit adultery

Non commettere adulterio

Neither shall you steal

Non rubare

Neither shall you bear false witness against your neighbour

Non pronunciare falsa testimonianza contro il tuo prossimo

Neither shall you covet your neighbour's wife and you shall not desire your neighbour's house, his field, or his manservant, or his maidservant, his ox, or his ass, or anything that is your neighbour's

For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also

Non desiderare la moglie del tuo prossimo, né il suo schiavo, né la sua schiava, né il suo bue, né il suo asino, né alcuna cosa che appartenga al tuo prossimo.


Là dov'è il tuo tesoro, sarà anche il tuo cuore

Say, come, I will recite from Qur'an what God has made a sacred duty for you: Ascribe nothing as equal with God;
Be good to your parents;
You shall not kill your children on a plea of want; we provide sustenance for you and for them;
You shall not approach lewd behaviour whether open or in secret,
You shall not take life, which God has made sacred. Thus does God command you, that you may learn wisdom.
And you shall not approach the property of the orphan, except to improve it, until he attains the age of maturity.
Give full measure and weight, in justice; no burden should be placed on any soul but that which it can bear.
And if you give your word, do it justice, even if a near relative is concerned; and fulfill your obligations before God. Thus does God command you, that you may remember.
Verily, this is my straight path: follow it, and do not follow other paths which will separate you from God's path. Thus does God command you, that you may be righteous.


Venite, nel Corano vi reciterò quello che il vostro Signore vi ha proibito e cioè: non associateGli alcunché, siate buoni con i genitori, non uccidete i vostri bambini in caso di carestia: il cibo lo provvederemo a voi e a loro.
Non avvicinatevi alle cose turpi, siano esse palesi o nascoste. E non uccidete nessuno di coloro che Allah ha reso sacri.
Ecco quello che vi comanda, affinché comprendiate.
Non avvicinatevi se non per il meglio i beni dell'orfano, finché non abbia raggiunto la maggior età, e riempite la misura e date il peso con giustizia.
Non imponiamo a nessuno oltre le sue possibilità. Quando parlate siate giusti, anche se è coinvolto un parente. Obbedite al patto con Allah.
Ecco cosa vi ordina. Forse ve ne ricorderete.
In verità questa è la Mia retta via: seguitela e non seguite i sentieri che vi allontanerebbero dal Suo sentiero. Ecco cosa vi comanda, affinché siate timorati.

This, then, is how you should pray:
Our Father in heaven,
hallowed be your name,
your kingdom come,
your will be done
on earth as it is in heaven.
Give us today our daily bread.
Forgive us our debts,
as we also have forgiven our debtors.
And lead us not into temptation,
but deliver us from the evil one.
For if you forgive men when they sin against you, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. But if you do not forgive men their sins, your Father will not forgive your sins.

When you fast, do not look somber as the hypocrites do, for they disfigure their faces to show men they are fasting. I tell you the truth, they have received their reward in full. But when you fast, put oil on your head and wash your face, so that it will not be obvious to men that you are fasting, but only to your Father, who is unseen; and your Father, who sees what is done in secret, will reward you.

Do not store up for yourselves treasures on earth, where moth and rust destroy, and where thieves break in and steal. But store up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where moth and rust do not destroy, and where thieves do not break in and steal. For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also.
The eye is the lamp of the body. If your eyes are good, your whole body will be full of light. But if your eyes are bad, your whole body will be full of darkness. If then the light within you is darkness, how great is that darkness!
No one can serve two masters. Either he will hate the one and love the other, or he will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve both God and Money.
Do Not Worry

Therefore I tell you, do not worry about your life, what you will eat or drink; or about your body, what you will wear. Is not life more important than food, and the body more important than clothes? Look at the birds of the air; they do not sow or reap or store away in barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not much more valuable than they? Who of you by worrying can add a single hour to his life?
And why do you worry about clothes? See how the lilies of the field grow. They do not labor or spin. Yet I tell you that not even Solomon in all his splendor was dressed like one of these. If that is how God clothes the grass of the field, which is here today and tomorrow is thrown into the fire, will he not much more clothe you, O you of little faith? So do not worry, saying, 'What shall we eat?' or 'What shall we drink?' or 'What shall we wear?' For the pagans run after all these things, and your heavenly Father knows that you need them. But seek first his kingdom and his righteousness, and all these things will be given to you as well. Therefore do not worry about tomorrow, for tomorrow will worry about itself. Each day has enough trouble of its own.

I'm not worrying
Are you?
Well, you should!
Worry about your Self
Worry about your God
Worry about your Life
Worry about today!
Yes, do worry about today
Today is the day you find Me
Find Me
Find
God
FIND GOD
And God will find You
Remember:
I AM YOUR GOD
Your God
Your
God
I
God
Glory Me
Glory to Me God
Your God Be Glorified
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In
Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
In Excelsis Deo Gloria Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis
Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis DeoGloria In Excelsis
Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Tuo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Tuo
Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis
Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria Deo Tuo
Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis DeoGloria In
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In
In Excelsis Deo Gloria Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis
Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
Your God Be Glorified
Glory to Me God
Glory Me
God
I
God
Glory to Me
Your God Your Glory
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis
Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo In
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria Deo Tuo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo Tuo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria In Excelsis
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria Deo Tuo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria Deo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Gloria
Gloria In Excelsis Deo Tuo
Gloria In Excelsis Deo
Gloria In Excelsis
Gloria Deo Tuo
Gloria Deo
Gloria
Deo
Glory to Me Your God I Am God Your God Always In You Lord Your God
Glory to Me Your God I Am God Your God Always In You Lord Your God Glory
Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Gloria Mihi Deo Tuo
Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Gloria Mihi
Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Gloria
Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Gloria Mihi In Excelsis
Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Gloria Mihi Deo Tuo
Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Gloria Mihi In
Excelsis Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Deo
Gloria Mihi In Excelsis Gloria
Mihi In Excelsis Gloria Mihi
Gloria Mihi In Excelsis
Gloria Mihi Deo Tuo
In Excelsis Gloria
Mihi In Excelsis
Gloria Mihi
In Excelsis
Gloria
Deo
Ego

ELI ELI LAMA SABACHTHANI!


Bareh de 'El eth'amar wabar `elyon eqroneh - “The Son of God!” it will be said, and “The Son of the Highest” they will call Him
'Abba debashmaya' nethqadash shmak - Father that is in heaven, will be hallowed your name
Wa-tethe melkuthak wa-nayuwan tsabyan-nayak ba'ar`a ayk dabashmaya - And your kingdom will come and your wills will be done in the earth, as in heaven
Man da-'it leh 'adne' lemeshem`a nesh-shem`a - Whoever has an ear that he may hear, he will hear!

Kai autoV eparaV touV ofqalmouV
autou eiV touV maqhtaV autou elegen:
Makarioi oi ptwcoi
oti umetera estin h basileia tou Qeou.
Makarioi oi peinwnteV nun
oti cortasqhsesqe.
Makarioi oi klaionteV nun
oti gelasete.
Makarioi este otan
mishswsin umaV oi anqrwpoi
kai otan aforiswsin umaV
kai oneidiswsin
kai ekbalwsin to onoma umwn
wV ponhron
eneka tou uiou tou anqrwpou.
Carhte en ekeinh th hmera
kai skirthsate idou gar
o misqoV umwn poluV en tw ouranw
kata ta auta gar epoioun
toiV profhtaiV oi patereV autwn.


Thus we proceed with Thomas Aquinas to the first point of his demonstrating that I exists...
It seems that God's existence is self-evident, for those things are said by us to be self-evident the knowledge of which is naturally within us, as is the case with first principles. But, it is said "The knowledge of God's existence is naturally implanted in all things." Therefore God's existence is self-evident.

Furthermore, those things are said to be self-evident the truth of which is obvious once the meaning of the words is clear. For example, when we understand the means of the words "whole" and "part," we immediately realize that every whole is greater than its part. Once we understand the meaning of the word "God," however, it immediately follows that God exists. The words itself signifies "that being a greater than which cannot be signified." That which exists in fact and in the mind is greater than that which exists in the mind alone. Thus, since the moment we understand the meaning of the word "God" he exists in our minds, it follows that he must also exist in fact. Thus God's existence is self- evident.

Furthermore, it is self-evident that truth exists, for whoever denies the existence of truth simultaneously concedes its existence. If truth does not exist, then it is true that truth does not exist; yet if something is true, then truth exists. God, however, is truth itself. "I am the way, the truth and the life". Therefore God's existence is self-evident.

But on the contrary, no one can think the opposite of what is self-evident, as Aristotle remarks. One can, however, think the opposite of the proposition "God exists," for, as the Psalm says, "The fool says in his heart, 'there is no God." Thus it is not self-evident that God exists.

Response: It must be said that a thing can be called "self-evident" in two- ways, in itself and in relation to us. A proposition is self-evident when its predicate is included in the definition of its subject. For example, in the proposition "man is an animal," the idea of "animal" is included in the definition of "man." Thus if everyone knows the definitions of both subject and predicate, the proposition will be self-evident to all, as is the case with the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are so common that no one is ignorant of them, such as "being" and "nonbeing," "whole" and "part," etc. If, the proposition may be self-evident in itself, but not to them. Thus it happens that some things are common conceptions of the mind" and are self-evident "among the learned only, such as that incorporeal beings do not occupy a place."

I say, therefore, that this proposition, "God exists," is self-evident in itself, since the predicate is the same as the subject. For God is his own existence, as will be seen later. Nevertheless, because we do not know what is involved in being God, the proposition is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated through those things that are more evident to us though less evident to themselves, namely God's effects.

To the first argument, therefore, it must be said that a general and confused knowledge of God's existence is naturally infused within us, for God is man's beatitude and man naturally desires beatitude. What man naturally desires he naturally knows. This is not to know God's existence specifically, however. It is one thing to know that someone is approaching and quite another to know that Kinkazzo is approaching, even though that someone may actually be Kinkazzo. Many people think that the perfect good of man called "beatitude" is wealth, some imagine it to be pleasure, and so on.

To the second argument it must be said that he who hears the name "God" may perhaps not know that it signifies "something greater than which cannot be conceived," since some people have thought of God as a body. Granting, however, that someone should think of God in this way, namely as "that being a greater than which cannot be conceived, "it does not follow on this account that the person must understand what is signified to exist in the world of fact, but only in the mind. Nor can one argue that it exists in fact unless one grants that there actually exists in fact something a greater than which cannot be conceived. It is, however, precisely this assertion the atheist denies.
To the third, it must be said that the existence of truth in general is self- evident to us, but it is not self-evident that this particular being is the primal truth.

Let us proceed to the second point. It is objected (1) that the existence of God is not demonstratable: that God's existence is an article of faith, and that articles of faith are not demonstratable, because the office of demonstration is to prove, but faith pertains (only) to things that are not to be proven. Hence that God's existence is not demonstratable. Again, (2) that the subject matter of demonstration is that something exists, but in the case of God we cannot know what exists, but only what does not . Hence that we cannot demonstrate God's existence. Again, (3) that if God's existence is to be proved it must be from what He causes, and that what He effects is not sufficient for His supposed nature, since He is infinite, but the effects finite, and the finite is not proportional to the infinite. Since, therefore, a cause cannot be proved through an effect not proportional to itself, it is said that God's exisence cannot be proved.

But against this argument the apostle says, "The unseen things of God are visible through His manifest works." But this would not be so unless it were possible to demonstrate God's existence through His works. What ought to be understood concerning anything, is first of all, whether it exists. Conclusion. It is possible to demonstrate God's existence, atthough not a priori (by pure reason), yet a posteriori from some work of His more surely known to us.

In answer I must say that the proof is double. One is through the nature of a cause and is called propter quid: this is through the nature of preceding events sirnply. The other is through the nature of the effect, and is called quia, and is through the nature of preceding things as respects us. Since the effect is better known to us than the cause, we proceed from the effect to the knowledge of the cause. From any effect whatsoever it can be proved that a corresponding cause exists, if only the effects of it are sufficiently known to us, for since effects depend on causes, the effect being given, it is necessary that a preceding cause exists. Whence, that God exists, although this is not itself known to us, is provable through effects that are known to us.

To the first objection above, I reply, therefore, that God's existence, and those other things of this nature that can be known through natural reason concerning God. I., are not articles of faith, but preambles to these articles. So faith presupposes natural knowledge, so grace nature, and perfection a perfectible thing. Nothing prevents a thing that is in itself demonstratable and knowable, from being accepted as an article of faith by someone that does not accept the proof of it.

To the second objection, I reply that, since the cause is proven from the effect, one must use the effect in the place of a definition of the cause in demonstrating that the cause exists; and that this applies especially in the case of God, because for proving that anything exists, it is necessary to accept in this method what the name signifies, not however that anything exists, because the question what it is is secondary to the question whether it exists at all. The characteristics of God are drawn from His works. Whence by proving that God exists through His works. Whence by proving that God exists through His works, we are able by this very method to see what the name God signifies.

To the third objection, I reply that, although a perfect knowledge of the cause cannot be had from inadequate effects, yet that from any effect manifest to us it can be shown that a cause does exist, as has been said. And thus from the works of God His existence can be proved, although we cannot in this way know Him perfectly in accordance with His own essence.

Let us proceed to the third article. It is objected (1) that God does not exist, because if one of two contradictory things is infinite, the other will be totally destroyed; that it is implied in the name God that there is a certain infinite goodness: if then God existed, no evil would be found. But evil is found in the world; therefore it is objected that God does not exist. Again, that what can be accomplished through a less number of principles will not be accomplished through more. It is objected that all things that appear on the earth can be accounted for through other principles, without supposing that God exists, since what is natural can be traced to a natural principle, and what proceeds from a proposition can be traced to the human reason or will. Therefore that there is no necessity to suppose that God exists. But as against this note what is said of the person of God I am that I am. Conclusion. There must be found in the nature of things one first immovable Being, a primary cause, necessarily existing, not created; existing the most widely, good, even the best possible; the first ruler through the intellect, and the ultimate end of all things, which is God.

Aquinas answers that it can be proved in five ways that God exists: Good on you, Aquinas! Let's see...

The first and plainest is the method that proceeds from the point of view of motion. It is certain and in accord with experience, that things on earth undergo change. Now, everything that is moved is moved by something; nothing, indeed, is changed, except it is changed to something which it is in potentiality. Moreover, anything moves in accordance with something actually existing; change itself, is nothing else than to bring forth something from potentiality into actuality. Now, nothing can be brought from potentiality to actual existence except through something actually existing: thus heat in action, as fire, makes fire-wood, which is hot in potentiality, to be hot actually, and through this process, changes itself. The same thing cannot at the same time be actually and potentially the same thing, but only in regard to different things. What is actually hot cannot be at the same time potentially hot, but it is possible for it at the same time to be potentially cold. It is impossible, then, that anything should be both mover and the thing moved, in regard to the same thing and in the same way, or that it should move itself. Everything, therefore, is moved by something else. If, then, that by which it is moved, is also moved, this must be moved by something still different, and this, again, by something else. But this process cannot go on to infinity because there would not be any first mover, nor, because of this fact, anything else in motion, as the succeeding things would not move except because of what is moved by the first mover, just as a stick is not moved except through what is moved from the hand. Therefore it is necessary to go back to some first mover, which is itself moved by nothing---and this all men know as God.

The second proof is from the nature of the efficient cause. We find in our experience that there is a chain of causes: nor is it found possible for anything to be the efficient cause of itself, since it would have to exist before itself, which is impossible. Nor in the case of efficient causes can the chain go back indefinitely, because in all chains of efficient causes, the first is the cause of the middle, and these of the last, whether they be one or many. If the cause is removed, the effect is removed. Hence if there is not a first cause, there will not be a last, nor a middle. But if the chain were to go back infinitely, there would be no first cause, and thus no ultimate effect, nor middle causes, which is admittedly false. Hence we must presuppose some first efficient cause---which all call God.

The third proof is taken from the natures of the merely possible and necessary. We find that certain things either may or may not exist, since they are found to come into being and be destroyed, and in consequence potentially, either existent or non-existent. But it is impossible for all things that are of this character to exist eternally, because what may not exist, at length will not. If, then, all things were merely possible (mere accidents), eventually nothing among things would exist. If this is true, even now there would be nothing, because what does not exist, does not take its beginning except through something that does exist. If then nothing existed, it would be impossible for anything to begin, and there would now be nothing existing, which is admittedly false. Hence not all things are mere accidents, but there must be one necessarily existing being. Now every necessary thing either has a cause of its necessary existence, or has not. In the case of necessary things that have a cause for their necessary existence, the chain of causes cannot go back infinitely, just as not in the case of efficient causes, as proved. Hence there must be presupposed something necessarily existing through its own nature, not having a cause elsewhere but being itself the cause of the necessary existence of other things---which all call God.

The fourth proof arises from the degrees that are found in things. For there is found a greater and a less degree of goodness, truth, nobility, and the like. But more or less are terms spoken of various things as they approach in diverse ways toward something that is the greatest, just as in the case of hotter (more hot) which approaches nearer the greatest heat. There exists therefore something that is the truest, and best, and most noble, and in consequence, the greatest being. For what are the greatest truths are the greatest beings. What moreover is the greatest in its way, in another way is the cause of all things of its own kind (or genus); thus fire, which is the greatest heat, is the cause of all heat, as is said in the same book (cf. Plato and Aristotle). Therefore there exists something that is the cause of the existence of all things and of the goodness and of every perfection whatsoever---and this we call God.

The fifth proof arises from the ordering of things for we see that some things which lack reason, such as natural bodies, are operated in accordance with a plan. It appears from this that they are operated always or the more frequently in this same way the closer they follow what is the Highest; whence it is clear that they do not arrive at the result by chance but because of a purpose. The things, moreover, that do not have intelligence do not tend toward a result unless directed by some one knowing and intelligent; just as an arrow is sent by an archer. Therefore there is something intelligent by which all natural things are arranged in accordance with a plan---and this we call God.

In response to the first objection, then, I reply what Augustine says; that since God is entirely good, He would permit evil to exist in His works only if He were so good and omnipotent that He might bring forth good even from the evil. It therefore pertains to the infinite goodness of God that he permits evil to exist and from this brings forth good.

My reply to the second objection is that since nature is ordered in accordance with some defined purpose by the direction of some superior agent, those things that spring from nature must be dependent upon God, just as upon a first cause. Likewise, what springs from a proposition must be traceable to some higher cause which is not the human reason or will, because this is changeable and defective and everything changeable and liable to non-existence is dependent upon some unchangeable first principle that is necessarily self-existent as has been shown.

Therefore I exists!


Isn't it great?
I exist I do exists I exists
I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I exist I exist I exists I

THIS SHOULD REALLY COMFORT AND CONSOLE YOU

I necessarily exist.

That's also Descartes opinion, didn't you know?

Listen to him saying it:
God necessarily exists!

Well, well -- So, there is the main conclusion. Now you need to find the premises.

Clearly, the proof depends on the fact that Descartes has an idea of Me which has so much objective reality that it could not have been made by him. So, you are probably going to need the list of kinds of ideas. Here:

-Ideas are either innate (inborn or known from one's own nature), adventitious (come from outside me) or made by you.
-Formal reality is characteristic of things.
-Some things have more formal reality than others.
-To exist is to be good.
-Greater goodness or perfection therefore implies that some things have more existence than others.
-Substances have a greater amount of formal reality than modes or accidents.
-Infinite substances have more formal reality than finite substances.
-Objective reality is the reality characterisic of ideas in virtue of the fact that the idea represents some realtiy.
-Some ideas have more objective reality than others, depending on the formal reality of the things which they represent.
-There is at least as much reality in an efficient cause as in its effect. (This is revealed by the natural light)
-The ideas in you are like images that may well fall short of the things from which they derive but cannot contain anything greater or more perfect. (This is revealed by the natural light)

OK so far?
Descartes is doing well...

-If you can be sure that the objective reality of one of your ideas is so great that it isn't in you either formally or eminently and hence that you cannot be the cause of that idea, you can infer that you are not alone in the world--that there exists something else that is the cause of the idea.
-You have the ideas of yourself, of God, of angels, of animals, of physical objects and of other men like you.
-You could have composed your ideas of animals, other men and angels.
-You could have composed your ideas of physical objects without these existing.
-There is more reality in an infinite than in a finite substance.
-The more perfect serves as a standard to judge the less perfect.
-You use God as the standard to judge that you are imperfect.
-Your grasp of the infinite must be prior to your grasp of the finite.
-The idea of God is completly clear and distinct and contains more objective reality than any other idea.
-But perhaps you are greater than you have assumed and so could be the cause of the idea of a being with all perfections.
-The gradual increase in you knowledge shows that you are imperfect. (All of these things are revealed by the light of nature).

Isn't that great? I therefore EXIST. You should read all of Descartes on the above and have a real ball! On the other hand, I am here already, so why bother?

Of all the imbecilic way of Man to demonstrate his purposeless quest for God, he keeps missing the target by looking outside himself.
I am INSIDE
as well as outside: you'd thik you would look inside first, THEN outside - as a logical consequence.
But no, no way.
Man is foolish, man is stupid, man is destructive
self-destructive mostly
and obsessive
and close-minded
narrow-minded
tunnel-minded
dark-minded
seeing things where he should not
not seeing things where he should
...but don't worry

BE HAPPY!

I, your God, am here and I, your God, do exist.
I exist in you
I exist in Me
I am YOUR God

However, there is no way to prove that I exist
as there is no way to prove that I do not exists
but the fact that Man exists is proof enough that I exist
as I exist in Man
as Man exists in Me

Just for the fun of it
let's see some more arguments about Me and My Existence, even from a Middle Eastern perspective (cannot always be biased toward Western and Far Eastern philosophies - I did start my Monologue not too far from the Nile, didn't I?)........

First, the Cosmological Arguments:

Every event must have a cause, and each cause must in turn have its own cause, and so forth. Hence, there must either be an infinite regress of causes or there must be a starting point or first cause. This is called "the cosmological argument". Notable medieval philosophers reject the notion of an infinite regress and insist that there must be a first cause, and the first cause must be Me — GOD — the only uncaused being.

Another form of this argument is based on the concept of a prime-mover. This is the Aristotelian form of the argument also propounded by Averroes. The premise being that, every motion must be caused by another motion, and the earlier motion must in turn be a result of another motion and so on. The conclusion thus follows that there must be an initial prime-mover, a mover that could cause motion without any other mover.

Me again!

Two kinds of perspectives may be considered with regard to the cosmological argument. A positive Aristotelian response strongly supporting the argument and a negative response which is quite critical of it.

One of the arguments for the existence of God based upon purely empirical premises revolves around the principle of determination , that is prior to the existence of the universe it was equally likely for it to exist or not to exist. The fact that it exists, implies that it required a determining principle which would cause its existence to prevail over nonexistence. This principle of determination is Me, your God.

This is similar to Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz argues that everything in the world is contingent: that it may or may not have existed. Something will not exist unless there is a reason for its existence. This rests on his premise that the actual world is the best possible world, as such we can account for everything in it as being there for a specific reason. But the universe as a whole, requires a further reason for existence, and that reason for Liebniz is Me, God.

Unfortunately, I should note that Liebniz' theory of the best possible world is flawed. I'm pretty sure you can conceive of a better world than any possible 'best' world that can be created. An additional unit of pleasure or goodness can be added to it to make it better. Therefore, it seems implausible to think that a 'best possible world' could ever exist.

There are difficulties with this kind of an account of the universe. It seems to lead to the conclusion that all truths are necessary. That is, if everything exists because the reasons for its existence supersede the reasons for it nonexistence, then it will necessarily exist. Everything and anything with a sufficient reason to exist will exist. Therefore, the universe and everything in it, must necessarily exist. Since, the superiority of its potential existence over its nonexistence provides the required determining principle or sufficient reason, for it to exist.
It appears now that the bringing into being of the universe is not contingent upon My Will, rather it is something that is as necessary as My very existence. This seems implausible. In response Liebniz argues that its existence is only theoretically necessary and God may or may not implement it. However, if God is all good, He would clearly be obliged to bring into being the best possible world.

Uhmm…

A second argument of his draws its inspiration from Islamic and Aristotelian sciences. It states that only God is indivisible, and everything other than God is in some way composite or multiple. Apparently I-God have no matter, no form, no quantity, no quality, no relation; nor am I-God qualified by any of the remaining categories. I-God have no genus, no differentia, no species, no proprium, no accident.

I am immutable…

I am, therefore, absolute oneness, nothing but oneness. Everything else must be multiple.

This was a crucial distinction for some past philosophers, upon which they rested some of their main arguments for God's existence. In their theory only God's oneness is necessary whereas that of all others is contingent upon God. Hence all other beings single or multiple must emanate from the ultimate essential being. In addition this first being must be uncaused, since it is the cause of everything else.

The material world cannot exist ad infinitum because of the impossibility of an actual infinite. The material world can also not be eo ipso eternal, because of the impossibility of an infinite duration of time, since the existence of time is contingent upon the existence of bodies and motion, which have been shown to be finite. As such the world requires a creator, or rather a generator, who could generate the world ex nihilo.

Me.

I am the Generator.

Other arguments presented are similar versions of the first cause argument, and hence are subject to the same criticisms that apply to any cosmological argument. These criticisms come not only from western scholars but also Islamic ones, such as Al-Ghazzali, who is unconvinced by the first-cause arguments. In response to them he writes,

According to the hypothesis under consideration, it has been established that all the beings in the world have a cause. Now, let the cause itself have a cause, and the cause of the cause have yet another cause, and so on ad infinitum. It does not behoove you to say that an infinite regress of causes is impossible.

Ghazzali thought that it is at least theoretically possible for there to be an infinite regress, and that there is nothing that necessitates a first-cause simply by pure deductive reason. He thus undermines one of the essential premises of the first-cause argument.

Others also reject the argument stating that, logically speaking, the movement from the finite to the infinite as embodied in the cosmological argument is quite illegitimate; and the argument fails in toto. For Muhammad Iqbal the concept of the first uncaused cause is absurd; he says:

It is, however, obvious that a finite effect can give only a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an uncaused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds.

It is for these reasons that modern philosophers almost unanimously reject the cosmological argument as a legitimate proof for the existence of God. Kant for example also rejects any cosmological proof on the grounds that it is nothing more than an ontological proof in disguise. He argued that any necessary object's essence must involve existence, hence reason alone can define such a being, and the argument becomes quite similar to the ontological one in form, devoid of any empirical premises.

Some contemporary western philosophers propose to show, contrary to what Ghazzali thought, that the universe must have necessarily had a beginning. A contrast is drawn between two concepts, the "potential infinite" and an "actual infinite."
A potential infinite is a concept of an infinite series, to which more things can be added. For example, there maybe and infinite number of integers, however in any one set there will be a finite number of them. An "actual infinite" would be a set which would contain all possible integers. This would be impossible, since there are an infinite number of integers. Once a set is defined, another integer can always be found to add to it. They can never actually exist. Famous mathematician David Hilbert stated:

… the actual infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought — a remarkable harmony between being and thought…

This forms an essential part of the argument, it demonstrates that an infinite regress could not exist, and that the universe can not possibly be actually infinite, in and of itself. The argument goes on to show that if the universe could not be actually infinite or eternal, given the principle of causality, it must have a first-cause or creator, which is Me, God.

Now, it maybe argued, that if an actual infinite cannot exist, then how can I exist? Since the concept of God, is one of an uncaused and infinite being.

One answer would be that it is not fair to ask this question of God, since God is not an "actual infinite." God is not a set or collection of things, He is one. God is an absolute unity, and hence God should not be thought of as an 'infinite'.
It is not clear, however, if this argument successfully shows the impossibility of an infinite: a common response has been to point out that there is no problem imagining an infinite that begins at the present and continues into the future, so it follows that it is entirely conceivable for the same infinity to continue in the past as well.

Contemporary supporters of this argument have reformulated the first-cause argument to take away the difficulty of explaining why an infinite regress would be impossible. They interpret the endless series that it excludes, not as a regress of events back in time, but as an endless and therefore eternally inconclusive regress of explanations. Thus a move is made from an infinite regress of events to an infinite regress of explanations.

That is, if events can be explained with reference to other events there must be an ultimate reality of self-explanatory events behind this complex that would make the collective set comprehendible. Hence, no longer is a creator being sought, rather given the creation an ultimate reality is being sought which would explain, or make sense of, the complex and plethora of phenomena in the world. Even here, the non-theistic skeptic will ask what reason do we have to think that the universe is not simply an "unintelligible brute fact"?

Teleological Arguments:

The version of the argument from design is best known in contemporary philosophy for the analogy of a watch…

Suppose that while walking in a deserted remote location one comes across a watch. Upon examining this device one may ask themselves how did this object come into existence. Surely it could not be by pure chance, it is composed of intricate and complex internal design. You are likely to think that it was a product of an intelligent designer, i.e. there must be a watchmaker. In the same way, it is argued that the universe is much more complex and manifestly designed. The extraordinary design is evident from planets and galaxies at the cosmic level to human cells and atoms at the quantum level. Therefore this world must have an intelligent creator.

Me. Again.

This form of the argument can be seen as an inference to the best explanation. That is given the remarkable phenomena of the universe, the best possible explanation for this, must be the existence of God. This is also explainedin terms of the Likelihood Principle, which is defined as: "O" strongly favors "H1" over "H2" if and only if "H1" assigns to "O" a probability that is much bigger than the probability that "H2" assigns to "O".

Here "O" is an observation, and "H" is a hypothesis. The likelihood may be mathematically written as [P (O/H)]: the probability of the observation given the hypothesis. The principle in probability theory form would state that "O" strongly favors "H1" over "H2" if and only if "P(O/H1) >> P(O/H2)." This however is not to be confused with the Probability Principle which states can be written as "[P (H/O)]."

These are two important distinct principles. An example can be given of the observation (O) as follows: while sitting in a cabin one hears rumblings in the attic. On the basis of this one forms the hypothesis (H) that there are gremlins in the attic and they are bowling. Now it is clear that the P (O/H) is very high, that is, if there were gremlin's bowling (H) the likelihood of the rumbling noise (O) would be quite high. But P (H/O) in this case is very low. Since given the rumbling noise (O), the probability of the explanation being bowling gremlins (H) is small. "The gremlin hypothesis has a high likelihood but a low probability given the noises we hear". The Likelihood Principle is a much better way to understand the inference to the best explanation, since in the case of God a hypothesis is being formed on the basis of observations, in the teleological sense.
There are some philosophers that attempt to apply the Likelihood Principle to the watch example. That is, given that the watch is intricate and well-designed for timekeeping (O), the inference that it was designed by an intelligent creator (H1) is higher than the conclusion that it came into being via random natural processes. Symbolically written it would be stated: P(O/H1) >> P(O/H2).

Next it can be argued that if one accepts the above reasoning one is then obliged to accept the reasoning given for the universe as a whole, which is as follows:
• O - The world is intricate and well-designed for the purpose of supporting life.
• H1 - The world is the product of an intelligent designer.
• H2 - The world is the product of random physical processes.

Given the above, a claim would be that P(O/H1) >> P(O/H2). Both of the above are inferences to the best explanation on the basis of the Likelihood Principle outlined earlier. This notion can be rejected arguing that the likelihood of an evolutionary hypothesis supersedes the likelihood of a creationist hypothesis.

Go and figure it…

Here are also early attempts to make reference to the teleological proof for the existence of God. The teleological argument analyses the material world and infers from it an Artificer or a creator, a self-conscious being of unlimited intelligence and power, who created this extremely complex world for a purpose and that creator is God. Muhammad Iqbal once again criticizes this argument in the following terms:
At best, it [teleological proof] gives us a skillful external contriver working on a pre-existing dead and intractable material the elements of which are, by their own nature, incapable of orderly structures and combinations. The argument gives us a contriver only and not a creator; and even if we suppose him to be also the creator of his material, it does no credit to his wisdom to create his own difficulties by first creating intractable material, and then overcoming its resistance by the application of methods alien to its original nature. The designer regarded as external to his material must always remain limited by his material and hence a finite designer...

Iqbal is pointing out that any argument from design rests on the extraordinary complexity and almost perfect arrangement of the universe, so as to compel the observer to infer that there must be an intelligent designer. This is consistent with the watchmaker example presented before. The two cases, the watch and the universe, are however, different.

Unlike the case of the watch, where its builder put the complex machine together given pre-existing material, the universe and its material itself created by God also. That is, there is no point in finding it extraordinary that God would be able to organize pre-existing "intractable" material in such an elegant fashion. The only reason we would have of thinking so, would be if it was a difficult task to design the universe. But then why would God, first create a difficult task for Himself and then go on resolve the difficulty by arranging into a sophisticated pattern? In addition, God would be limited in what He could create by this pre-existing material. This, to Iqbal, does not seem consistent with the Islamic concept of an omnipotent God. Iqbal writes, "There is really no analogy between the work of the human artificer and the phenomena of Nature".

Bertrand Russell joins in this criticism, commenting on the teleological explanation, he professes,

But if a man is so obstinately teleological as to continue to ask what purpose is served by the creator, it becomes obvious that his question is impious. It is, moreover, unmeaning, since, to make it significant, we should have to suppose the Creator created by some super-Creator whose purposes He served.

Both Iqbal and Russell point out that it is inappropriate for a person who believes in God to put forth an argument for His existence on teleological grounds.
The British philosopher David Hume also rejected the teleological argument, for different reasons. For him the argument from the best explanation is an inductive argument, and Hume had argued that inductive knowledge and causation is not possible. Hume rejected all theological works and claimed that they fail certain philosophical tests. He contended that metaphysical knowledge was not possible by either abstract or experimental reasoning. The problem of induction argues that it is impossible to make a justified inference from the observed to the unobserved. This is applicable to all such inferences.

An example of such an inference is the following: we observe that "the sun rises everyday and has risen everyday for over several thousand years" on the basis of this observation we make an inference that: "Hence that the sun will rise tomorrow". Hume claims that we are not at all justified in such an assumption. He asks what makes such an inference justifiable? Hume recognizes that we spontaneously make such an inference and that perhaps we have no control over it. But he is asking what is our justification for this supposed causal relationship? He asserts where is the causal glue that links the rising of the sun yesterday to the rising of the sun tomorrow?

The only argument that can be made in support of it is that "Nature is uniform," i.e. Nature has been uniform and will remain uniform thus we are justified in making inferences to unobserved events on the basis of what we have been observing. However, it must be noted that this argument in itself is an inductive one and begs the question.

This is similar to the argument for the existence of God from induction, since the argument is being made that we can use empirical/inductive proofs, i.e. we can make inferences based upon what we observe (empirical) to the unobserved (God, Metaphysical). Hume denies that any such inference is at all logically justifiable. Bertrand Russell in response to this attitude states,

It is therefore important to discover whether there is any answer to Hume within the framework of a philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical. If not, there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity.... This is a desperate point of view, and it must be hoped that there is some way of escaping from it.

Most Muslim philosophers too have attempted to get around this vexatious problem by simply recognizing the Quranic emphasis on the uniformity of nature, accepting it as such and thus avoiding this problem. The above problem of induction gave rise to modern skepticism and remains a fascinating unsolved puzzle.

Kant's Critique of Empirical Evidence:

Kant raises a powerful objection to any theory that claims to grasp knowledge of God. He claims that in terms of knowledge there can be no jump from the physical to the metaphysical. Kant distinguishes between noumanal and phenomenal objects. The noumena are objects that lie beyond all possible experience, and the phenomena are the ones we directly experience. Hence, for him the metaphysical is the noumenal realm. He argues that there can be no possible relation between two realms that have no connection between them. How can we prove that a certain noumanal object exists from phenomenal premises? he asks.

One comment says:

It is especially discordant for Kant on the one hand to consign reason in its determination of actuality completely to the data of experience, and on the other to entrust to it the power of bringing us to unconditional certainty regarding an infinite being lying beyond all possibility of experience.

Although Kant does not deny that there are metaphysical objects (in fact he argues for their existence from practical reason), he rejects this particular avenue for arriving at what he calls synthetic and a priori objects.

A response to Kant's criticism of metaphysical existence from empirical experience can be as follows: "Kant's verdict can be accepted only if we start with the assumption that all experience other than the normal level of experience is impossible. The only question, therefore, is whether the normal level is the only level of knowledge-yielding experience." There are other levels of experience that can bear knowledge as well.

Ontological Arguments:

The modern form of the ontological argument in modern western philosophy was made famous by Anselm and Descartes. The argument rests on the premise that existence is a predicate that a being could have or lack. A summary of Anselm's argument is as follows:
• P1) God is a being than which nothing greater can be conceived.
• P2) A being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist in our thought.
• P3) Either a being than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in thought alone and not in reality or a being than which nothing greater can be conceived exists both in thought and in reality.
• P4) If the greatest conceivable being existed in thought alone we could think of another being existing in both thought and reality.
• P5) Existing in thought and reality is greater than existing in thought alone.
• C) Therefore: A being than which nothing greater can be conceived (God) exists in thought and in reality.

Simply by pure reason, without any reference to the world, Anselm argues for God. A key feature of these kind of arguments is that they try to show not only that God exists, but that he necessarily exists. That is, He cannot, not exist.

I therefore exists!

Let's go on…

The existence of God is an essential feature of its being just like the angles of a triangle always add up to 180 degrees. It would be impossible to think of God without it existing. Descartes writes,

From the fact that I cannot think of a mountain without a valley, it does not follow that a mountain and a valley exist anywhere, but simply that a mountain and a valley, whether they exist or not are mutually inseparable. But from the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is inseparable from God.

Hence, the very essence of God, to even make the concept of God intelligible it must exist. This argument has been widely criticized.

Kant criticized the argument from two perspectives. First he points out that, although, the concept that all three sides of the triangle add up to 180 is an analytical concept, there is still nothing that shows that it must exist. Similarly the idea that existence analytically belongs to the concept of God is an illegitimate inference. He writes,

To posit a triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory; but there is no self-contradiction in rejecting the triangle together with its three angles. The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being.

Secondly, he rejects Descartes argument on the grounds that existence is not a predicate that can be added or taken away from a concept. That is, existence is not like any of the other properties that are associated with 'things.' To say that something exists, is simply to say that the concept is instantiated in the world. He claims this on the basis of his distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.

An analytic statement is one of the kind, "all bachelors are unmarried males," or "the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180." In these statements the predicates, "unmarried males" or "sum of angles is 180" does not add any new information to the concept of "bachelors" or "triangle." Analytic statements are true by virtue of their meaning alone.

A synthetic statement is something that adds more information about the object in question. For example, "all ravens are black," is synthetic. The predicate "are black" tells us more information about the subject "ravens." Kant's claim is that statements of the sort, "X exists" are analytic. It does not add anything additional to the concept. Hence the inference that existing in reality is greater than existence in thought alone is false. The reductio ad absurdum from pure thought to God, of Anselm and Descartes thus fails according to Kant.

The closest form of parallel thought to this can be found in the thought of Avicenna. He also shared Descartes methodological doubt and proposed a somewhat similar ontological argument for the existence of God. Avicenna also propounded that God is a necessary being, however, his argument unlike Descartes is not a purely rational one. Avicenna believed that we possess a direct intuitive apprehension of the reality and existence of this necessary being. He believed that it would be impossible to think concretely without the existence of such a being. Averroes, however, insists that there can be no rational proof for God's existence and it can only be grasped via the medium of intuition.

The God that Avicenna argues for is a Necessary Being. A being that necessarily exists, and everything else besides it is contingent and depends upon it for its existence. God has no other essence besides his existence. His essence just is His existence. Since, God is the only being in which the essence and existence are to be found together, the essence of all other beings precedes their existence. Thus He is absolutely simple, and no has no further attributes.

I am absolutely simple.

In his book al-Shifa Avicenna explains that since the Necessary Being has no genus or differentia it is both indefinable and indemonstrable. As such "neither its being or its actions can be an object of discursive thought, since it is without cause, quality, position or time". All other entities do not exist necessarily or essentially, rather they are merely contingent beings (per accidens). The characteristics of God offered by Avicenna drew major criticisms from the contemporary Muslim orthodoxy, who found his definition incompatible with Islamic doctrine. "not a particle remains hidden from God in the heavens or on the earth". How can God be omniscient if He has no attributes.

He does try to explain, however, how his description would be compatible with God having knowledge of the world. In knowing Himself, God is capable of knowing everything that emanated from Him. Since God does not have sense-perceptual knowledge He cannot know the particulars, but rather only the essences or universal principles. But according to Avicenna this does not exclude him knowing the specifics of any given event. Knowing all the antecedents and consequences in the causal chain, allows God to place the event temporally and differentiate it from all other events. Hence, his theory does not preclude God's knowledge of the specifics. Al-Ghazzali was not satisfied with this account and criticized Avicenna stating that the theory being presented would not allow for change in divine knowledge with the introduction of the time factor.

Another important characteristic of Avicenna's ontology was the fact that he believed that the universe is eternal. This was another belief, which was not acceptable to the Islamic orthodoxy. He thought the creative ability of God was linked to His intellectual nature and thus flowed eternally of rational necessity from Him. Although the universe exists as an independent body, its existence is still contingent upon God. God and the world are different, but the existence of the world depends upon God. This can be seen as refinement, or rather 'islamization' of the Aristotelian view that God and the universe were two distinct beings which did not interact with each other.

Problem of Evil:

One of the major arguments proposed against My existence in contemporary western philosophy is the problem of evil. It is based upon the inability to reconcile the magnitude of evil in the world with the all-loving nature of God.

Listen to this: "If God is perfectly loving, God must wish to abolish all evil; and if God is all-powerful, God must be able to abolish all evil. But evil exists; therefore God cannot be both omnipotent and perfectly loving."

This thus causes difficulty for the Judeo-Christian-Islamic God who possess both qualities of being all-loving and omnipotent. David Hume is a proponent of this view and argues that the sheer amount of evil, which may outweigh the good, in the world makes dubious that a deity exists.

The main response to this kind of an argument is known as the free-will defense. It is based on the premise that for God to create self-directly and independent agents like humans, he had to grant a certain amount of freedom to them, and this freedom would inevitably result in human-to-human evil. It has been proposed that there need not be a contradiction between God creating morally free agents and making it the case that all their actions turn out to be good.

But it can be argued that in that case, are the beings really as free as humans? If all our actions were predestined in this way, there would be a sense in which we would not be free and only an allusion be created thereof. Although God could have created beings of this sort, they would have amounted to mere puppets and not vibrant beings as envisioned by God.

The Free Will Defense:

The primary difficulty with the problem of evil is resolving the apparent conflict between the reality of evil in the world and the claim that God is:
• Omniscient -- All knowing
• Omnipotent &endash; All powerful and
• Wholly Good

One version of the free will defense is to compare the current state of the world with a world in which all actions were good and no evil was possible. It is important here to point out that the good that is being referred to is 'moral good.' That is, it is good that is a result of the conscious actions of people. This is distinct from 'natural good' or 'natural evil' which maybe result from non-human causes. The free will defense (FWD) theorist points out that in order for man to be in a position to do 'moral good' he must be 'significantly free.' That is, he must be in a position to make a choice between making a morally good or evil action. Given that in the current world (World-1) human agents are given this freedom, a certain level of moral evil is unavoidable. This world would still be more preferable to a possible World-2 in which there were no free actions (thus no freedom) but all actions performed were entirely good.

A critic of this defense will point out that if God is all-powerful (omnipotent) then it ought to be in His capacity to create a World-3 in which humans had freedom, yet all their actions turned out to be good. Thus their actions would be predetermined to be good, yet they would still have the free option of choosing between morally good or bad actions. The agent would have the freedom to chose any action they like, it would just be that whatever choice they made it would turn out to be good. This would entirely be within God's power since He is omnipotent and is only limited by logical impossibilities.

The challenge for the FWD theorist is to show that Freedom and Causal Determinism are both mutually inconsistent. It can't both be the case that humans are free agents, and that their actions are causally predetermined. The crucial question is, can God can create any world?

Here's one attempt to answer this question. First, one points out that Leibniz was mistaken in thinking that God would have to, and thus did, create the best possible world. One can argue that there can be no such thing as the best possible world, since to any world one more unit of pleasure or goodness can be added to make it even better. Thus it seems implausible to think of the best possible world as existing. This then is one instance when God cannot create any world. Secondly, one argues that God cannot create a world in which Man is both significantly free, yet his actions are already determined. A proof on this premise has to do with a thought experiment.

We can imagine a case in the present world in which we know given certain conditions person A would hypothetically engage in a morally evil action. It would no be impossible for God to create a world that were almost identical the present world, except that the person would then not engage in the evil. Since, to do so would deny him the freedom of individuality and his personality. That is, for God to ensure that he not engage in the evil would deny his freedom. The only other solution is for God to not create the world at all: for any world God could create, which included freedom, there is at least one action on which Man would go wrong, or else he could not create any world at all. This phenomenon is called transworld depravity. Therefore, for God to create a world in which humans had moral freedom, the existence of both Good and Evil is necessary.

Islamic philosophers of the middle ages did not address this problem in any direct fashion. This maybe because in the context of Muslim thought, the existence of God was a prerequisite. In fact, the aim of the philosophers was to prove the existence of God using Aristotelian logic. So we do not find Muslim philosophers arguing against the existence of God, on the contrary they are attempting to justify the qualities of God from a philosophical perspective.

The Muslim philosophers did, however, tackle a different but somewhat similar issue concerning the unity of God. The central problem facing them was how to reconcile the absolute unity and perfection of God with the fact that there exists in the world such great amounts of imperfections. If God is all perfect and the world is a result of divine will, we are then faced with the problem of duality between God and His will. Yet it is this very difference (i.e. the imperfection of the world) that sets it apart from God (who is perfect).

How is this consistent with the absolute unity of God which is so central to Islamic doctrine? This issue had been one of the major issues of Muslim thought, and was a subject of great debate between Al-Ghazzali, and other neo-platonic Muslim thinkers.

It is, however, difficult to find any direct analogue to the problem of evil in medieval Islamic philosophy. However, some positions held by early Muslim thinkers maybe relevant to the free will defense. Early Muslim Aristotelian thinkers like Ibn Sina held that God is a necessary being, who had no other attributes besides His existence, and that all other beings emanated from the divine by necessity. Despite holding this position, they attempted to reconcile it with Islamic doctrines.

Ghazzali points out that this is not possible. That is, to say that whatever proceeds from God does so by necessity denies God agency, i.e. it denies Him Free Will. If God has no will, since he has no attributes, then God has no free choice to decide which world to create. It seems that Ghazzali's criticism can be equally applied to advocate of the problem of evil who states that God by necessity must always in a way that will ensure that its consequences are wholly good. This would then break down the dilemma posed by trying to reconcile the divine attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, wholly goodness versus the reality of evil in the world. Since, now God would not be obliged to abide by the condition of wholly goodness.
Another stream of thought in Islam, advocated by Ghazzali, Ibn Arabi, Al-Attas and Islamic mystical traditions, is to argue that the only true way to grasp the ultimate reality, and thus resolve this problem is through a "direct awareness of Reality," unencumbered by intellectual interference.

In modern times, the 20th century Islamic philosopher Muhammad Iqbal attempts to address this problem. He suggests that Goodness would not be possible without the resistance of evil. The evil in the world is meant to be overcome. Whoever asks why must there be evil when God can remove it is missing the point. Iqbal insists that without evil there could be no moral or spiritual development. He cites a simile used by Kant in which he refers to birds who resent the resistance of air, yet it is the very air that allows them to fly high, they would be unable to do so in a vacuum. Likewise, a certain amount of evil is necessary for the inner growth of humans, so that they may be able to overcome it. As the Quran states, "And for trial will We test you with evil and with Good".

Iqbal could here be subject to criticism, since he has ignored the victims of evil. What about those people who suffered so the rest of mankind could build itself? Iqbal's answer here would be consistent with his philosophy of self. Like Nietzche, Iqbal believed that ultimately the self, the individual is the only thing of utmost importance. That is we have no concrete knowledge of the external world and factors therein. What we can be sure of is only ourselves, hence, we must view happenings to beings other than ourselves only in the capacity in which they help to build ourselves. The fact that the suffering of an innocent victim serves to bolster our personality is sufficient. The independent suffering of the external individual cannot be verified.

Nietzche has criticized Christian theology for placing mankind in a state of guilt for the original sin, Iqbal had pointed out that this concept of original sin is absent in Islam, and that the Quran encouraged a positive self image of the self or man. Many modern Christian theologians also adopt this view.

Arguments from Religious Experience:

There have been arguments presented for the existence of God which are non-analytical, and do not rely an purely logical or empirical premises. There is a strong strand within classical Islamic philosophy, beginning with Al-Ghazzali, to strongly put forth this view, and at the same time deny the legitimacy of the purely theoretical arguments for God's existence. Muhammad Iqbal will also defend this view, however, he attempts to provide reconciliatory possibilities of reason with religious experience in concert with his organic world-view.

The principles for an Islamic epistemology are laid out in the Quran as it defines three avenues for knowledge. These are namely,
• 1. Certainty by Sense-Perception (ain al-yaqin) or empirically derived knowledge;
• 2. Cognitive Certainty (ilm al-yaqin) or knowledge by pure reason;
• 3. Absolute Experienced Certainty (haqq al-yaqin) or knowledge by intuition.
These are sometimes called modes of knowledge. A Muslim Sufi philosopher explains:

The sensory mode is experienced through we eat and smell, the cognitive is through knowledge, whether self-evident or acquired, while the intuitive is similarly divided: It can either be self-evident or acquired. However, he who has access to intuitive, which is to say divine knowledge, knows instinctively what other must acquire through the exercise of their cognitive faculties.

It is this last form of knowledge, the intuitive, that the arguments from religious experience aim at. There is some disagreement on the significance of intuitive knowledge and even if it is necessary, is it sufficient for an Islamic epistemology of metaphysics? Ghazzali argues in the affirmative, however modern philosophers Iqbal and Al-Attas assert that intuitive knowledge must work in concert with other 'modes' of knowledge as well.

al-Ghazzali
The first major critic of philosophy in the Islamic tradition was Abu Hamid ibn Muhammad al-Ghazzali (1058-1111 CE). Ghazzali felt that no formulation of an epistemology based on human reason could possibly account reasonably for the metaphysical existence of God.

He was an influential Islamic scholar and became interested in philosophy after studying various quarreling Muslim intellectual movements. He then decided to embark on a project to determine, what is certain knowledge? And is it possible by humans?
To accomplish his goal Ghazzali, much like Descartes, engages in a methodological doubt. Unlike Descartes, however, Ghazzali reaches a much more radical conclusion about our ability to have "certain knowledge." He begins by defining what he means by "certain knowledge." He writes:

The search after truth being the aim which I propose to myself, I ought in the first place to ascertain what are the bases of certitude. In the second place I ought to recognize that certitude is the clear and complete knowledge of things, such knowledge as leave no room for doubt, nor any possibility of error.

Thus, the kind of knowledge Ghazzali is seeking is such that the object of knowledge is known in a manner which precludes all possibilities of doubt.

There are only two sources of knowledge that are available to us, and those, according to Ghazzali, are sense-perception and pure reason. He writes:

We cannot hope to find truth except in matters which carry their evidence in themselves, i.e. in sense-perception and necessary principles of thought; we must, therefore first of all establish these two on a firm basis.

As a first step he concludes that the only knowledge that could qualify as "certain" would be of the kind that would fit the above description, i.e. knowledge of sense-perception or self-evident or necessary truths. Next Ghazzali examines the extent of knowledge allowed via these avenues. He quickly realizes that sense-perception cannot be a source of certain knowledge since it is often not trustworthy. For example, he observes shadows appear to be stationary, whereas they move, and planets appear to be coin-sized whereas astronomical evidence points to the contrary.
Having discarded knowledge of the senses, Ghazzali now moves towards knowledge of necessary truths. He thinks that this is not a credible source of knowledge either.

If he could not trust one kind of knowledge, why should he trust the other? He thought he had no reason to prefer one over the other. One of the issues that made him doubt the utility of necessary principles were questions such as, is 10 more than 3? Can something be and not be at the same time? Can something be both necessary and impossible? He thought reason alone, could not provide a satisfactory answer to these questions. Hence, making an analogy between the two, Ghazzali denies knowledge of necessary proposition as well. His argument here is quite controversial, and Iqbal strongly criticizes Ghazzali on this count.

Ghazzali is now in a position where he has convinced himself, that the only two avenues of knowledge open to him are not reliable. He is confused and considers the possibility that life could be a dream. He was in a state of continuos doubt and unable to ground anything in truth and existence, he suffered from this like a real sickness. Until he realized a "light which God infused into his heart, which is the key to most species of knowledge". This he considers similar to how the Prophet Mohammed describes it, "the dilation of the heart, whereby it becomes prone to the reception of Islam." He, therefore was able to transcend everyday experience and realize the ultimate reality via a spiritual experience.

What Ghazzali is suggesting is a "possibility of a form of apprehension higher than rational apprehension, that is, apprehension as the mystic's inspiration or the prophet's revelation". This new form of knowledge is what he calls intuition. It is distinct from knowledge by the senses or the intellect, in that in intuitive knowledge is only possible via divine facilitation.

Ghazzali and Descartes both agree that knowledge by sense-perception is unreliable, but Ghazzali makes the further claim that knowledge by pure theoretical reason alone is also unreliable. Descartes, on the other hand, had built his entire epistemology on the basis of the viability of knowledge by pure reason.

Iqbal's Critique of Ghazzali
Muhammad Iqbal is also critical of Ghazzali's characterization of knowledge. He thought that Ghazzali was mistaken in giving up reason and thought and embracing mystic experience as the only exclusive way the totally infinite could be revealed to an individual. Iqbal writes:

He failed to see that thought and intuition are organically related and that thought must necessarily simulate finitude and inconclusiveness because of its alliance with serial time. The idea that thought is essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the Infinite, is based on a mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge.

For Iqbal, there is no inherent difficulty in a finite being grasping the reality of an infinite one. Thought is dynamic and is revealed via a temporal vision over time. He further explains how the infinite can come into the comprehension of a finite being. Using a Quranic metaphor, the infinite according to Iqbal is "'a kind of 'Preserved Tablet', which holds up the entire undermined possibilities of knowledge as a present reality, revealing itself in serial time as a succession of finite concepts appearing to reach a unity which is already present in them. It is in fact the presence of the total Infinite in the movement of knowledge that makes finite thinking possible."

Thus, the continuos revealing of the infinite over a temporal period allows the finite to grasp the essence of the infinite God. It is not that at any point the finite intellect will be able to fully comprehend the limitless and infinite, but rather that it is the potential of thought to be itself without limit, that allows it to have an understanding of the limitless, at least in principle. Naquib Al-Attas, a contemporary Muslim philosopher and disciple of Al-Ghazzali's school, explains the concept of intuition as understood by him:

We maintain that all knowledge of reality and of truth, and the projection of a true vision of the ultimate nature of things is originally derived through the medium of intuition. The intuition that we mean cannot simply be reduced to that which operates solely at the physical level of discursive reason based upon sense-experience, for since we affirm in man the possession of physical as well as intelligential or spiritual powers and faculties which refer back to the spiritual entity, sometimes called intellect, or heart, or soul, or self, it follows that man's rational, imaginable and empirical existence must involve both the physical and spiritual levels.

Here he reaffirms both physical (material) and spiritual (metaphysical) levels as necessary for intuition. However, special emphasis is placed upon the spiritual. This concept of intuition is a major theme both within higher Islamic philosophy and mysticism. It holds that the ultimate reality can be directly and spontaneously experienced and truth can become self-evident with complete clarity.

Iqbal is trying to point out that, intellectual reason and intuition are inseparable, and that in the act of comprehending something by intuition, the intellect plays an indispensable role, which cannot be discounted. He thus thinks that Ghazzali was mistaken in his claim that reason and intuition could not interact and were incompatible. Iqbal saw both of these avenues as complimentary, towards ultimate knowledge.

Muhammad Iqbal
Iqbal gives his account of the possibility of religion in the last lecture in the reconstruction entitled "Is Religion Possible?"

For Iqbal, religion is not something that is isolated from philosophy. He advocates an integration of the two, sometimes suggesting that the science of psychology has not reached an advanced enough level to be able to incorporate spiritual experience as part of a scientific theory of knowledge. Iqbal thinks, given adequate methods, the ultimate reality is within human grasp. He writes,

The truth is that the religious and the scientific processes, though involving different methods, are identical in their final aim. Both aim at reaching the most real. In fact, religion… is far more anxious to reach the ultimately real than science."

One of the major objections to proofs from religious experience has been that, religious experience is incommunicable and as such has no value as 'evidence' since it is not transferable from one person to the other. That is, person A may see the truth of a proposition whereas person B may not, and there is no way for person A to demonstrate to person B, how he came to believe a certain thing.

Iqbal does not think that this is a problem. Rather precisely this "problem" is the foundation of his worldview. He had an organic view about the universe as a whole and people as we encounter them. In our everyday life we see other individuals as mere functions, and only deal with them in so far as their conceptual relation to us is concerned.

We do not pursue them any further for any ultimate reality. Thus when seeking the divine we cannot and do not rely upon "others." The clue to the ultimate reality must be contained within the ego (person). The individual self must then be the only way to certain knowledge.

It maybe that what we call the external world is only an intellectual construction, and that there are other levels of human experience capable of being systematized by other orders of space and time -- levels in which concept and analysis do not play the same role as they do in the case of our normal experience.

The incommunicability of religious experience is an essential part of what makes it different from 'normal experience.' Strictly speaking, the experience which leads to this discovery is not a conceptually manageable intellectual fact; it is a vital fact, an attitude consequent on an inner biological transformation which cannot be captured in the net of logical categories.

Intuition then is a valid form of knowledge yielding experience. This does not, however, mean that it is divorced from reason. Iqbal explains, although real, we do not have the tools at our disposal to evaluate this process of "inner biological transformation." The scientific method we have today is not sufficient to apply to these kinds of experiences, since scientific "concept and analysis" may not be applicable to this sort of experience as they are to physics. Al-Attas advocating a similar view states,

Belief has cognitive content; and one of the main points of divergence between true religion and secular philosophy and science is the way in which the sources and methods of knowledge are understood.

At this level of experience, "the act of knowledge is a constitutive element in the objective reality". He thought God could not be removed from his creation. Not in the pantheistic sense, but in that the ultimate reality cannot stand as an 'other' to the universe or person (as Avicenna thought). Rather, they are interlinked, and in looking within ourselves for this higher level of experience, the ultimate reality would be revealed unto the individual. As Iqbal explains, this higher level of experience is not at the sensational or representational level, rather it is better described as a feeling rather than concepts. He writes, "It is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part."

This for Iqbal is the mystic experience that leads to ultimate certain knowledge. This knowledge is irresistible and like bright sunshine forces itself immediately to be perceived as soon as the mind turns its attention to it and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt or examination, but the mind is perfectly filled with the clear light of it.

It should be mentioned that, although Iqbal offers the above explanation of the way in which an individual may access the ultimate, he draws his inspiration from Einstein and Nietzsche . Einstein's theory of relativity gave him hope, that his theory about the way the finite and the infinite are related is possible. Relativity shattered traditional notions of space, time and thus matter. The line between the physical and metaphysical had been blurred or rather interconnected. Hence, there is great philosophical debate at the frontiers of modern physics over what happens in extreme situations on the cosmological scale.

Nietzsche's emphasis on individuality deeply impressed Iqbal, who thought that Nietzsche was on the right track, if only he had not been distracted by naturalistic theories of Schopenhauer, Darwin and Lange mistakenly explaining away the existence of God. Hence, Nietzsche was a failure. But he had realized an essential truth. That is, ultimately what matters is the ego, self, and nothing else. Thus it is not significant if reality is not transferable from one to another.

What matters is the "me" and not the "other."

It is also significant that Iqbal thought, that if a sufficient understanding of the 'mental' was achieved it would indeed be (at least theoretically) possible within the science of psychology to gain a better sense of the kind of deeper experience Iqbal is referring too. This maybe relevant to the concept in philosophy of Mind known as Anomalousness of the Mental. It states that there are no causal laws that relate to mental events. This explains the difficulty of science and psychology in grasping these concepts. Iqbal, however, thinks that it is at least theoretically possible to be able to achieve a working understanding of mental events.

The theories of knowledge advocated by the proofs from religious experience may be considered externalist accounts.

Externalism is the view that some of the justifying factors of belief need not be cognitively accessible and maybe external to the mind of the individual. That is, a person can be justified in holding a belief even if they are not aware that they are in possession of all the reasons that make the position justified. Iqbal is advocating a similar view, in that the reasons, although they may objectively exist, are difficult to determine by the individual.

Externalism often rests on the premise of reliablism. That is, one way to know that something is true, without knowing all the reasons, is if the knowledge is received from a reliable source. For example, we may consider our vision and senses to be a reliable source to affirm the existence of the external world. In the same way Iqbal and Ghazzali describe the experience of the divine in terms of the sense. If this experience is reliable and originating from God, then we could affirm the knowledge without knowing all the reasons that justify God's existence. It appears, however, that what Iqbal wants to say is that the reasons for the justification of God are in theory accessible to humans, but in practice are much more difficult to determine compared to the direct mystic experience of the divine entity. This is consistent with the views of Al-Ghazzali and Ibn Arabi on this issue.

So... Hmmm...

Well, as you can see, there is a strong tradition of Islamic metaphysics and epistemology, which is as varied and complex as the Western one.

Everybody talks about Me!

There are strong and useful similarities of thought within Muslim and Western thought. Western philosophers have expanded upon many of the debates originating within the Islamic world, as the Muslims had done earlier with the Greek scholars.

The consensus among modern Muslim philosophers seems to be moving away from the purely empirical arguments for God's existence. The recent consensus of Islamic thinkers like Ghazzali, Al-Attas and Iqbal seem to prefer arguments from religious experience over the rational arguments.

I, for One, Am with both.

...Then there is

The Paradox of the Stone



Some of the various arguments for atheism claim that the concept of God is incoherent, that there are logical problems with the existence of such a being. Perhaps the best known of these is the paradox of the stone: Can God create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift it?
Either God can create such a stone or He can’t.

If He can’t, the argument goes, then there is something that He cannot do, namely create the stone, and therefore He is not omnipotent.

If He can, it continues, then there is also something that He cannot do, namely lift the stone, and therefore He is not omnipotent.

Either way, then, God is not omnipotent. A being that is not omnipotent, though, is not God. God, therefore, does not exist.

Ahaaaaaa!!!

Problems With the Paradox of the Stone:

Although this simple argument may appear compelling at first glance, there are some fundamental problems with it. Before identifying these problems, however, it is necessary to make clear what is meant by “omnipotence”.

Christian philosophers have understood omnipotence in different ways. Our friend René Descartes thought of omnipotence as the ability to do absolutely anything. According to Descartes, God can do the logically impossible; he can make square circles, and he can make 2 + 2 = 5.

Thomas Aquinas — we've seen it above — had a narrower conception of omnipotence. According to Aquinas, God is able to do anything possible; he can part the red sea, and he can restore the dead to life, but he cannot violate the laws of logic and mathematics in the way that Descartes thought that he could.

(actually, Descartes was right on that one…)

So, if Descartes’ conception of omnipotence is correct, then any attempt to disprove God’s existence using logic is hopeless (see?). If God can do the logically impossible, then he can both create a stone so heavy that he cannot lift it, and lift it, and so can do all things. Yes, there’s a contradiction in this, but so what? God can, on this understanding of omnipotence, make contradictions true.

That's right. God can.

Descartes’ understanding of omnipotence therefore doesn’t seem to be vulnerable to the paradox of the stone. Descartes can answer the question Yes without compromising divine omnipotence.

Aquinas’ understanding of omnipotence, which is more popular than that of Descartes (ever wondered why?), also survives the paradox of the stone. For if God exists then he is a being that can lift all stones. A stone that is so heavy that God cannot lift it is therefore an impossible object. According to Aquinas’ understanding of omnipotence, remember, God is able to do anything possible, but not anything impossible, and creating a stone that God cannot lift is something impossible.

Aquinas can therefore answer the question No without compromising divine omnipotence.

The paradox of the stone, then, can be resolved; it fails to show that there is an incoherence in the theistic conception of God, and so fails to demonstrate that I do not exist.

Happy?
I am

Go placidly amid the noise and haste, and remember what peace there may be in silence.

As far as possible, without surrender, be on good terms with all persons.
Speak your truth quietly and clearly; and listen to others,
even to the dull and ignorant; they too have their story.

Avoid loud and aggressive persons, they are vexations to the spirit.
If you compare yourself with others, you may become vain and bitter,
for always there will be greater and lesser persons than yourself.
Enjoy your achievements as well as your plans.

Keep interested in your own career, however humble;
it is a real possession in the changing fortunes of time.
Exercise caution in your business affairs, for the world is full of trickery.
But let this not blind you to what virtue there is;
many persons strive for high ideals,
and everywhere life is full of heroism.

Be yourself. Especially do not feign affection. Neither be cynical about love;
for in the face of all aridity and disenchantment it is as perennial as the grass.
Take kindly the counsel of the years, gracefully surrendering the things of youth.
Nurture strength of spirit to shield you in sudden misfortune.
But do not distress yourself with dark imaginings.
Many fears are born of fatigue and loneliness.

Beyond a wholesome discipline, be gentle with yourself.
You are a child of the universe no less than the trees and the stars;
you have a right to be here. And whether or not it is clear to you,
no doubt the universe is unfolding as it should.

Therefore be at peace with God, whatever you conceive Me to be.
And whatever your labours and aspirations, in the noisy confusion of life,
keep peace with your soul. With all its sham, drudgery and broken dreams,
it is still a beautiful world.


AND ALWAYS REMEMBER
Life is not measured by the breaths we take,
But by the breath we hold in wonder!

So, be cheerful - Strive to be happy

For I am with you


Reshith elohim bara shamayim erets
In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth

erets tohu bohu choshek
And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was

panim tehom ruach rachaph
upon the face of the deep - And the Spirit of God moved

panim mayim elohim
upon the face of the waters - And God said, Let there be

or or elohim or
light and there was light - And God saw the light, that it

tob elohim badal or choshek
was good: and God divided the light from the darkness

elohim or yom choshek
And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called

layelah, layil ereb boqer
Night - And the evening and the morning were the

echad yom elohim raqia
first day - And God said, Let there be a firmament in the

tavek mayim badal mayim mayim
midst of the waters, and let it divide the waters from the waters

elohim asah raqia badal mayim
And God made the firmament, and divided the waters which

tachath raqia mayim

were under the firmament from the waters which were above the

raqia elohim raqia
firmament: and it was so - And God called the firmament

shamayim ereb boqer sheni
Heaven - And the evening and the morning were the second

yom elohim mayim tachath shamayim
day - And God said, Let the waters under the heaven be

qavah maqom yabbashah raah
gathered together unto one place, and let the dry land appear: and

elohim yabbashah erets
it was so - And God called the dry land Earth; and the

miqveh mayim yam elohim
gathering together of the waters called he Seas: and God saw that

tob elohim erets dasha deshe
it was good - And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass

eseb zera ets peri
the herb yielding seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his

min zera erets
kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth: and it was so

erets deshe eseb zera
And the earth brought forth grass, and herb yielding seed after

min ets peri zera
his kind, and the tree yielding fruit, whose seed was in itself, after

min elohim tob ereb
his kind: and God saw that it was good - And the evening and

boqer shelishi yom elohim
the morning were the third day - And God said, Let there

maor raqia shamayim badal yom
be lights in the firmament of the heaven to divide the day from

layelah, layil oth moed
the night; and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for

yom shanah maor raqia
days, and years: And let them be for lights in the firmament

shamayim or erets
of the heaven to give light upon the earth: and it was so

elohim asah gadol maor gadol maor
And God made two great lights; the greater light to

memsheleth yom qaton maor memsheleth
rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the

layelah, layil asah kakab elohim
night he made the stars also - And God

nathan raqia shamayim ot
set them in the firmament of the heaven to give light upon

erets mashal yom layelah, layil
the earth, And to rule over the day and over the night, and

badal or choshek elohim
to divide the light from the darkness: and God saw that it was

tob ereb boqer rebii yom
good - And the evening and the morning were the fourth day

elohim mayim sharats
And God said, Let the waters bring forth abundantly the

sherets nephesh oph uph
moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the

erets raqia shamayim elohim bara
earth in the open firmament of heaven - And God created

tannin chai nephesh
great whales, and every living creature that moveth, which the

mayim sharats min
waters brought forth abundantly, after their kind, and every

kanaph oph min elohim tob
winged fowl after his kind: and God saw that it was good

elohim barak parah rabah
And God blessed them, saying, Be fruitful, and multiply, and

male mayim yam oph rabah erets

fill the waters in the seas, and let fowl multiply in the earth

ereb boqer chamishshi, chamishi
And the evening and the morning were the fifth
yom elohim erets sharats
day - And God said, Let the earth bring forth the

nephesh min behemah remes
living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and

chaiyah, cheva min elohim
beast of the earth after his kind: and it was so - And God

asah chaiyah, cheva min behemah

made the beast of the earth after his kind, and cattle after their

min remes erets
kind, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth after his

min elohim tob elohim

kind: and God saw that it was good - And God

asah adam tselem demuth
said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let

radah dagah yam
them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the

oph behemah erets
fowl of the air, and over the cattle and over all the earth, and over

remes remes erets elohim
every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth - So God

bara adam tselem tselem elohim bara
created man in his own image, in the image of God created he

zakar neqebah bara elohim barak
him; male and female created he them - And God blessed them

elohim parah rabah male
and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish

erets kabash radah dagah
the earth ,and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the

yam oph chaiyah
sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that

erets elohim hinneh
moveth upon the earth - And God said, Behold, I have given

eseb zera panim
you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the

erets ets peri ets

earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree yielding

zera oklah chaiyah, cheva
seed; to you it shall be for meat - And to every beast

erets oph
of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that

remes erets nephesh
creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every

yereq eseb oklah elohim
green herb for meat: and it was so - And God saw every thing

asah meod tob
that he had made, and, behold, it was very good - And the

ereb boqer shishshi yom
evening and the morning were the sixth day - Thus the

shamayim erets kalah tsaba
heavens and the earth were finished, and all the host of them

shebii yom elohim kalah melakah

And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had

asah shabath shebii yom melakah
made; and he rested on the seventh day from all his work which

asah elohim barak shebii yom qadesh
he had made - And God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified

shabath melakah
it: because that in it he had rested from all his work which

elohim bara asah
God created and made


AMEN
A[l] Me[lech] N[e'eman]
Lord God King Who is Trustworthy
Signore Dio Re Fiducia e Verità
So Be It そうそれがありなさい
אמן amen آمين
Amen Cosí Sia 如此假如是
So sei es 이렇게 그것 있으십시요
Ainsi que ce soit
Seja assim ele
Tan sea
Adonoy Eloheynu Adonoy Echod
Adonai Elohaynu Adonai Echad
Baruchj Shem k'vod makchuso l'olom vo-ed
Barukh Shem k'vod malkhuto l'olam va-ed
V-ohavto es Adonoy Eloecho b-chol l'vovcho u-v-chol naf'sh'cho u-v-chol m'odecho
V-ahavta et Adonai Elohecha b-chol l'vavcha u-v-chol naf'sh'cha u-v-chol m'odecha
V-hoyu ha-d'vorim ho-ayleh asher onochi m'tzav'cho ha-yom al-l'vovecho
V-hayu ha-d'varim ha-ayleh asher anochi m'tzav'cha ha-yom al l'vavecha
Ani Adonly Elohaychem, Adonoy Elohaychem emes
Ani Adonai Elohaychem, Adonai Elohaycham emet

אמן AMEN آمين










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